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Paraphrasing a sentence from the Nobel Prize Robert Merton, without the Risk we would have not 
need of Finance; Economy would be sufficient to describe and manage financial transactions across 
agents and Countries . The ability of transferring the risk expresses the main aim of Finance; a correct 
evaluation of the counterparty risk is one of the main goal of credit risk theory. 
Financial crisis remark this necessity: if a financial contract such as a Credit Default Swap, which, by 
definition, is a tool to protect against the default risk of a counterpart, is traded  between banks and 
insurance companies that can not exactly evaluate  the financial position of customers, the effects on 
global Equilibrium and the loss of value can be severe. The question of pricing methodologies is 
strictly linked to the previous topic: is rating sufficient to catch all price fluctuations? What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of nowadays pricing methodologies? In which directions can them be 
switched or improved? Mathematics can give an answer to us? How information underlying market 
risk can be allowed into a Mathematical model of pricing in order not to affect a correct credit risk 
evaluation?  
These are the questions this article will answer. 
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Introduction  
At the web-page: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.htm it can be read: 
“The Basel Committee's final standard on the standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit 
risk exposures includes a comprehensive, non-modelled approach for measuring counterparty credit 
risk associated with OTC derivatives, exchange-traded derivatives, and long settlement transactions. 
[…] The SA-CCR will take effect on 1 January 2017.   […] The SA-CCR limits the need for 
discretion by national authorities, minimizes the use of banks' internal estimates, and avoids undue 
complexity by drawing upon prudential approaches already available in the capital framework. […] 
The Exposure At Default is multiplied by the risk weight of a given counterparty in accordance with 
either the Standardised or Internal Ratings-Based approaches for credit risk to calculate the 
corresponding capital requirement”. 
So, the recent regulation, in the European Union framework, about counterparty credit risk evaluation, 
is quite contradictory in itself. Indeed, the paper of March 2014, of which is cited above both the web-
page link and a part of the introduction, shows two basic policy features: on one hand, it processes the 
intention to make less rely on policy instruments which could allow for the rise of unjustified 
discretions. On the other hand, it fairy explains the presence of evaluation parameters, such as the 
Exposure At Default, which actually do depend on third parties (the Credit Rating Agencies) or on 
internal-bank models; this amplifies the possibility of errors or misleading evaluations of some 
financial instruments. 
Why is the European Union still stuck in such a regulatory framework? In which sense could still the 
mathematical tools underlying credit derivatives pricing be improved or why they are not? The paper 
is structured as follows: after a biref literature review, section 1 outlines an introductory framework 
about the current situation concerning credit risk and the demand for loans, in order to stress out the 
importance of a correct credit evaluation. Section 2 introduces the underlying mathematical framework 
required to understand the idea that Merton had; idea which completely revolutioned the financial 
instruments scenario and their pricing methodology, opening the so called ‘structural-form’ models. In 
Section 3 the Basel framework is presented, while Section 4 deals with the problem of the Credit 
Rating Agencies. Last Section presents two basic kind of approach which have given birth to models 
alternative to structural-form ones. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
For how much it concernes the world of financial derivatives, a good introduction is provided by a 
white paper by the Deutsche Börse Group, titled “The global derivatives market: an introduction”  
(Deutsche Börse AG, April 2008). A complete explanation of pricing models, detailed both in 
mathematics and in banking managements, can be found in the book by Andrea Resti, Andrea Sironi 
“Rischio e valore nelle banche: misura, regolamentazione, gestione” (Resti, 2008) or (B. Schmid, 
2002) which includes references to ratings.  
For which may concern structural-form models and reduced-form models, a practical mathematical 
introduction is provided by  (D. Filipovič, 2002). For deeper mathematics insight good references are 
the books  (Bielecky-Rutkowsky, 2014) or  (Duffie-Singleton, 2003). Apart from the article  (Duffie, 
2000), several mathematical models have been introduced  to overcome limitations of both structural-
form models and reduced-form models; examples are  (Guo-Jarrow-Zeng, 2009),  (Yu, 2005)  (U. 
Cetin, 2004, Vol. 14, No. 3). How to deal with credit derivatives  (J.P.Morgan, December 2013) or  
(Pallavicini, 2014). About credit ratings: empirical tests on Credit Default Swaps is in  (Chen-Cheng-
Wu) or (Benmelech, 2009); about rating methodology  (Standard & Poor's Rating Services, 2012). For 
further ideas on systemic risk implications of Basel framework: (Bonollo, Crimaldi, Flori, Pammolli 
Riccaboni, 2014). 
 
 
1. Correct credit evaluation request 
 
Credit loans statistics at the end of 2013 
 
Thanks to chart number 1 it’s possible to notice the situation concerning credit standards for the 
approval of loans to enterprises. The net percentage of banks that tightened credit standards for loans 
to households for house purchase became slightly negative (-1%, from 3%). For consumer credit, the 
net tightening remained broadly unchanged (at 2%). For the first quarter of 2014, euro area banks 
expect a further reduction in the net tightening on loans to nonfinancial corporations – to reach nil – 
and a more intense net easing for loans to households. In the last quarter of 2013, the demand for 
credit remained weak across all loan categories. However, the net decline in demand for loans to non-
financial corporations slowed further (-10%, from -12% in the previous quarter), thus approaching its 
historical average. This reflected the marked decline in the contractive impact of financing needs 
related to fixed investments (- 9%, from -22%), while the contribution to demand of other financing 
needs, including those related to inventories and working capital, faded away (1%, from 6%). 
That can be read: financing institutions want to overcome the period of market decline after which it 
could be notices very low demand for loans; this can be achieved by relaxing credit standards for the 
approval of loans to enterprises.  
Anyway, a market recovery seems still far away; at least, requests for credit are quite less than the 
expected values, even if with increasing trend, as it is shown by chart number 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit risks overview at the end of 2013 
 
Finally, it’s possible to understand the systemic implications’ scenario for credit risk by looking at the 
red ball in the following table: risk intensity is very high at systemic level; markets are correlated both 
‘geographically’ and at different levels of financial instruments, so it emerges an extremely fragile 
framework to deal with. 
 
 
 
Summing up the overview: the context of credit risk is extremely fragile in the last times, due to a very 
high contagion possibility and correlations between different financial markets. This situation, in 
which it appears as if every market’s move is a possible bullet shot at systemic level, is worstened by 
the low level of requests for loans, which are in turn generated  by slack underlying economic 
activities. 
Therefore, in such an alerting time, it’s not possible to override an extremely accurate risk evaluation: 
it does appear nomore merely as a risk management issue, since it affects entire economic systems. 
 
 
2. Structural-form models 
 
Merton and the contingent claim analysis 
 
A contingent claim is a claim that can be made only if one or more specified outcomes occur1; 
mathematically it can be defined as an asset V whose value depends on a stochastic process X and on 
time t.  
Merton, in 1974, was the first to apply this simple idea to model the evolution of a firm; consequently 
he could give a formula for firms’ insolvency risk. He exploited the principles of option pricing 
discovered one year before by Black and Scholes, by assuming that the company's debt is entirely 
represented by a zero-coupon bond. With this assumption, the default process of a company can be 
seen as driven by the value of the company's asset: default occurs when the market value of the firm 
(the value of its assets) is lower than that of its liabilities. Indeed, by the principle of limited 
responsibility, the stakeholder who can't generate cash flows sufficient to repay the debt he got  
towards a financial institution, cannot go default on his own means but just as a firm. Therefore, the 
payment to the debtholders at the maturity of the debt is the smaller between the face value of the debt 
or the market value of the firm's assets TV , just as the payoff of a put option: if the entire company 
                                                             
1 http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/c/contingent-claim. 
 
debt is represented by a zero coupon bond (that is the simplest financial title of debt, with just the 
repayment at the ending time of the contract, called “maturity”2), then, in this analogy, the payment to 
debtholders corresponds to the payoff at maturity to the bondholder, i.e. the bank; the final time for the 
due debt corresponds to the maturity of the bond, and technically the due debt corresponds face value 
of the bond minus a put option on the value of the firm, with a strike price equal to the face value of 
the bond and a maturity equal to the maturity of the bond. 
In the following are represented in details the two mechanism of the evolution of a firm’s asset and the 
payoff profile of a bank and in which way they reconcile, giving as a result the formulas we’re looking 
for, that are the value of the debt nd the price of the bond. 
Since the evolution of a firm’s asset3 is driven by the value of the company's asset, the risk of a firm's 
default is therefore explicitly linked to the variability of the firm's asset value. In this meaning, bonds, 
which are one of the most ‘secure’ financial contracts, become risky, since it’s not sure their 
repayment will take place at maturity. However, they are linked to structural observable data for 
quoted firms, that are the share prices: from this data it’s possible to gain some useful parameters, such 
as the assets’ instantaneous return and the volatility of return of firms’ assets. The firms’ asset 
percentage return is given by the brownian motion formula: 
 dtdt
V
dV
V    
with tV the market value of the firm, dependent on time; µ a parameter which catches the assets’ 
instantaneous return; V the variability of a random noise, that increases over time; more precisely, 
it’s the volatility of return of firms’ assets, measured by the standard deviation of assets’ return.  
 
Picture 1. The possible evolutions 
tt VdV /  
 
The credit risk is represented by the possibility that, at maturity T of the debt, the firm’s asset value 
TV  is less than the value of the loan repayment.  
The power of this idea lies in the fact that in one graph it’s possible to capture both the business risk, 
that is the degree of firm’s risk from being in the market, which is captured by the parameter of the 
Gaussian volatility, and the financial risk, that is the horizontal line ‘value of the debt’, which 
represents the ratio between assets/liabilities, i.e. the financial leverage of the firm 
V
FeL
iT
 . 
                                                             
2 A simple example could be found at: http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/bonds/zero-
coupon-bond-859.  
3 In this framework, we’re not directly interested in firms’ liabilities: we assume the assets represent the whole 
information necessary to understand the financial performance of a firm. 
On its side, the bank can fully cover its position by buying a put option, since the bank payoff profile 
is the same of a short put: for values of TV  greater to the nominal value of loan reimbursement, the 
asset's value is such that it is possible to repay the bank (or the creditors) of the entire principal plus 
accrued interest, and an eventual residual value goes to stakeholders; viceversa, for values of TV  
smaller than the debt, the firm is insolvent and the bank receives just a portion of the due payment. So, 
in order to cover its credit risk, the bank can buy a put option on the value tV of the firm's asset, with 
maturity equal to the maturity of the loan and strike price equal to the value of debt reimbursement. In 
this way, the combination of loan and purchase of put option gives as result a guaranteed payoff equal 
to the amount of the loan F . 
 
 
 
 
Some results 
 
If, to the bank, the syntetical position given by the sum of the price 0P  of the put option at time 0t  
and the value of the loan 0B  is at equilibrium, that means without any possible insolvency risk, then it 
must value as the payoff of a risk-free title which at maturity pays the amount of the loan F : 
iTFeBP  00 . Thanks to the option pricing model from Black and Scholes, it’s possible to get the 
price of the put option 0P  of a title that at maturity T repays F, with a discount factor i: 
 0120 )()( VdNdNFeP
iT    
where 0V  is the value of the firm assets today (time 0t ), N is the standard normal distribution 
function, which is tabulated, and 
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Consequently one obtains the value 0B of the loan, that increases with lower maturity of the loan T 
and lower financial leverage L already defined:  



   )(1)( 120 dNL
dNFeB iT  
Furthermore, the insolvency or default probability PD, which simply corresponds, for the bank, to 
exercise the put option in order not to lose its money: 
)(1)( 22 dNdNPD  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The Standardised Approach for measuring Counterparty Credit Risk exposures 
 
Counterparty Credit Risk measures 
 
From  (J.P.Morgan, December 2013)4 “Derivative contract are dynamic in nature and can therefore 
give rise to either an asset or a liability for a counterparty, depending on market movements”. So, the 
question is how to deal with the risk those contracts convey. We have at least to consider four 
disposable metrics conventionally used in the practice to monitor and measure counterparty exposure:  
 the notional of the contracts, which provides information around the total size of a product 
with a counterparty; it’s a metric to be careful with, because unlike bonds and loans, the 
notional of a derivative does not reflect the actual risk;  
 the current mark-to-market, that is a snapshot of the current exposure to a counterparty 
typically adjusted to reflect any netting (eg ISDA agreements) and collateral arrangements. 
This provides more information than the notional amount of derivatives in question. However, 
it is still limited in its information, particularly when the forward mark-to-market is expected 
to change, for example depending on the shape of the interest rate yield curve; in Basel 
framework, this metric is enhanced by incorporating a sense of the potential future exposure 
using a specific percentage of the notional of each transaction (‘add-on factor’) based on a grid 
for each underlying asset class and maturity. 
 the expected exposure, which quantifies how much the bank expects eventually to lose in case 
of an insolvency event; This represents the expected positive mark-to-market profile of a swap 
or portfolio of transactions reflecting any netting and collateral arrangements at different 
points in the future the potential future exposure add-on factor, when dealing with a bunch of 
derivatives, is based on the underlying asset classes and on the remaining maturity of the 
contract. 
 the stressed potential exposure, sometimes referred to as a peak exposure measure. represents 
amplified exogenous conditions due to possible contingent instabilities. 
Those measures synthetically enter the risk evaluation by the short formula: 
Counterparty credit risk = (Current net exposure + Potential future exposure) – collateral. 
 
 
The Exposure at Default in Basel III 
 
In the document  (Bank for International Settlements, 2014) the exposures under Standardised 
Approach for measuring Counterparty Credit Risk exposures, or SA-CCR5, consist of two 
components, the replacement cost (RC) and the potential future exposure (PFE): 
)(*4,1 PFERCEAD   
Without entering technical definitions, let’s just give some formulas that should remember something 
familiar. The formula for the replacement cost for unmargined transactions6 is given by7: 
                                                             
4 Available at: 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM/DirectDoc&urlname=is_napfms2013_pensions.pdf&track=
no, National Association of Pension Funds Limited 2013. 
5 The SA-CCR will apply to over-the-counter derivatives, exchange-traded derivatives and long settlement 
transactions. 
6 Unmargined transactions are those in which the variation margin is not exchanged, but collateral other than 
variation margin may be present. The variation margin consists in additional funds net to the initial margin; see 
more at: http://www.nasdaqomx.com/transactions/markets/commodities/clearing/risk-default-
management/margin-requirement  
)0;max( CVRC   
 
precisely the payoff of a call option; and  the one for margined transactions is similar8: 
)0;;max( NICAMTATHCVRC  . 
Furthermore, here there are the supervisory delta adjustments9: they exactly recall the parameters 
1d and 2d  of the Merton formulas. 
 
 
 
 
Where do ratings set in 
 
According to Basel regulation, for each asset class and subclass, there exist some supervisory factors, 
correlations and supervisory option volatility add-ons. For single-name credit asset class, subclasses 
differentiate for the credit rating, giving as a result different supervisory factor parameters. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 V is the value of the derivative transaction in the netting set; C is the haircut value of net collateral held. A 
collateral is something pledged as security for repayment of a loan, to be forfeited in the event of a default. 
8 The additional parameters in the last formula are related to the mark-to-market, i.e. the value of the portfolio 
at its current worth; their definition is omitted here for simplicity. 
9 Bank supervisors may also require more complex trades to be allocated to more than one asset class, 
resulting in the same position being included in multiple classes. In that case, for each asset class to which the 
position is allocated, banks must determine appropriately the sign and delta adjustment of the relevant risk 
driver. A supervisory delta adjustment is made to the trade-level adjusted notional amount based on the 
position (long or short) and whether the trade is an option, CDO tranche or neither, resulting in an effective 
notional amount. For also an EAD calculation process scheme see more at:  http://blog.usbasel3.com/basel-
committee-standardized-approach-for-calculating-counterparty-credit-risk-exposure-nimm-sa-ccr/  
 
 
 
 
4. The Credit Rating Agencies problem 
 
Rating evaluation 
 
The Rating evaluation is a method used to evaluate firms and financial instruments on the basis of 
their financial risk. The assessments of the rating are issued by the so-called credit rating agencies; 
The valuation it is expressed through a vote in letters, according to which the market establishes a 
risk premium to require the company to accept that particular investment, or the regulatory 
framework establishes calibrating parameters: down-going into rating scales increases the risk 
premium required and then the issuer must pay a spread greater than the risk-free rate. 
It has been talked of a “dictatorship of the analysts”, for their market power to influence the stock 
market, recognized them from the fact that the market in that part does not take into account the 
sometimes conflicting interests exists, and because on the other hand market is relatively 
interested in a truthful rating at a fair price of the securities. Even if in Basel regulatory framework 
a clear source for fair rating evaluations it’s not provided 10, it appears just as a kind of third 
externality, yet necessary, in the Standardized Approach valuation process. 
 
 
Timeline to reduce reliance on Credit Rating Agency ratings 
 
In November 2012, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published a roadmap11 to reduce reliance on 
Credit Rating Agency (CRA) ratings. The FSB roadmap set out a timeline with concrete actions for 
                                                             
10 A different kind of critique to the SA-CCR, regarding to choice of percentage parameters fro Credit single 
name asset class, is provided in this blog: http://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/2014/May/27/sa-ccr-ebleu-
basel-finalises-new-standardised-approach-for-measuring-counterparty-credit-risk-exposures.html   
11 FSB roadmap, available at: https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121105b.pdf  
jurisdictions with a view to implementing the FSB Principles12. In  May 2014, there is the European 
Union response13 to FSB request for actions plans on reducing reliance on CRA ratings. This joint 
response provides an overview and summarizes all the existing and ongoing policy actions following 
adopted EU Regulations, Directives and implementing legislation and binding technical standards.  
It also includes guidelines adopted by the European Supervisory Authorities (European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)). This response is complemented by any specific actions 
adopted at national level and which are not included in this response. For specific actions undertaken 
at national level, we refer to individual actions plans submitted by EU FSB Members. For central 
banking operations in the Euro area, we refer to the individual response by the European Central Bank 
(ECB). 
 
 
European Union response 
 
In the EU response, it can be read that “The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)/Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR) require credit institutions to have their own sound credit granting 
criteria and credit decision processes in place. This applies irrespective of whether institutions grant 
loans to customers or whether they incur securitization exposures. […] The CRD/CRR entered into 
force on 1st of January 2014, reflecting the approach taken to reduce reliance on external credit 
ratings.” 
But also that: “For the specific purposes of calculating regulatory bank capital requirements, rating 
agency assessments are, in certain instances, applied as a basis for differentiating capital requirements 
according to risks, and not for determining the minimum required quantum of capital itself. The CRD 
framework as a whole provides banks with an incentive to use internal rather than external credit 
ratings even for purposes of calculating regulatory capital requirements. In the specific case of 
securitisation exposures, due to a lack of sufficiently objective internal methodologies within banks, 
most of them would still be expected to calculate their regulatory capital requirements by reference to 
external ratings”.  
Summing up, something is changing towards a more independent and self-contained regulatory 
framework, but the road ahead is still long.  
 
 
5. Reduced-form and partial information models 
 
Mathematical underlying assupmtions 
 
So far, the structural-forms models have the following underlying assumption: every agent in the 
market can get the same level of disposable information. The mathematical device to represent 
information is called “filtration”. More precisely, a filtration  is a family of sets t on a probability 
space Ω. This family is increasing over time, i.e. each set is contained in the next one in time. The sets 
t , 
*0 Tt  , represent the level of disposable information at each point in time; so, the assumption 
of increasing sets means that agents don’t lose information as time goes by. Every structural-form 
model assumes complete knowledge, that means whole filtration underlying. 
 
 
Reduced-form models 
 
If everything is known or predictable, there is no space for the chance: unpredictable events may still 
happen in this framework, and may cause serious economic effects. The reduced-form models have 
                                                             
12 FSB Principles on Reducing Reliance on CRA ratings, available at: 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf  
13 Staff Working Paper EU Response to the Financial Stability Board (FSB)-EU Action Plan to reduce reliance on 
Credit Rating Agencies, May 2014. 
been introduced because, by exogeneity, not every default can be predicted. The mathematical 
framework beneath those models, sometimes called intensity based method, is the following. On a 
probability space ),,( P , consider two filtrations: F  and G , defined over the same time interval 
],0[ *T , one contained into the other: ],0[],0[ ** )()( TtTt FFGG  . The default arrival is modeled 
by an aleatory time ],0[: d . The hazard rate (default indicator function)  tdIH   is a 
( GF  )-adapted stochastical process; this means that a market participant with access to partial 
market information tG  cannot observe whether default has occurred by time t ( td  ) or not 
( td  ). Intuitively speaking, events in tF are tG -observable only in the second case, when default 
didn’t happen until time t. At time t, the probability of a default before maturity T is given by 
]|)([)( tGTHEtPD  . 
 
 
A partial information model 
 
Even if very versatile, intensity-based models are inconvenient to use for who knows many things 
about a firm; that could be stakeholders or well-informed private companies. The model provided in  
(Duffie, 2001) is based on the assumption that not everyone has the same information regarding a 
firm’s asset; so the idea is once again to use different filtrations on the same probability space. It can 
be called a ‘hybrid model’, because of the mixture of the two kind of model seen so far. It allow for 
the possibility of controlling the firm: the asset’s value is represented by a stochastical process V. The 
“structural part” of the model consists in choosing an optimal liquidation policy until the condition 
“asset less than liabilities” hold, that is done by solving a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. At the 
same time, it accounts for an unpredictable default arrival, which is “controlled” by the partial 
filtration14.  
 
Conclusions 
 
One should ask why modeling implementations are not often well reflected into the regulatory 
frameworks. In the financial field, more than in sociology, rules come after the mathematical or 
economical findings, but, more often, rules come after financial practices. The importance of credit 
ratings should give speed and motivation to private or public Credit Rating Agencies, in order to 
improve themselves, towards more efficient and accurate models of evaluation. The challenges for 
financial mathematicians are fair and always open. But what about a different risk management 
approach? Where does the border between risk appetite and resilience of financial systems lie? New 
findings are also desirable in this framework. 
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